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ABSTRACT    As part of the widespread turn to narrative in contemporary 
philosophy, several commentators have recently attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for 
the narrative cause, most notably in John Davenport and Anthony Rudd’s recent 
collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue. In 
the context of this debate, I argue that the aesthetic and ethical existence-spheres in 
Either-Or cannot adequately be distinguished in terms of the MacIntyre-inspired 
notion of “narrative unity”. Judge William’s argument for the ethical life contains far 
more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated by the 
idea of “narrative unity”, and the related idea that narratives confer intelligibility 
will not enable us to distinguish Kierkegaardian aesthetes from Kierkegaardian 
ethicists. “MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians” also take insufficient notice of further 
problems with MacIntyre’s talk of “narrative unity”, such as his failure to distinguish 
between literary narratives and the “enacted dramatic narratives” of which he claims 
our lives consist; the lack of clarity in the idea of a “whole life”; and the threat of 
self-deception. Finally, against the connections that have been drawn between 
Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt’s work on volitional identification, I 
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show something of the dangers involved in putting too much stress on unity and 
wholeheartedness. 
 
 
It has become increasingly common to suggest that we should understand various 
aspects of human life in terms of narrative. Narratives play a central role in human 
lives, from the education of children to the ways, according to many, in which adults 
attempt to understand their world and make sense of their lives. Various narrative 
conceptions of the self have been advanced, such as Alasdair MacIntyre‟s famous 
claim that the unity of the self “resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to 
life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end”.1 But it is far from clear exactly 
what claims about narrative made within different areas of philosophy and other 
disciplines amount to. It is especially unclear whether those who employ the term are 
using it in remotely the same way.  
 
Recently, several commentators have attempted to sign Kierkegaard up for the 
narrative cause. In the introduction to their fascinating collection of essays 
Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative and Virtue, John 
Davenport and Anthony Rudd describe MacIntyre‟s attempt at “understanding… 
human life in narrative terms” as “particularly Kierkegaardian”.2 There are good 
prima facie reasons to connect Kierkegaard and narrative, from his interest in and use 
of parables and biblical narratives
3
 to the fact that several of his best-known works, 
such as Either-Or and Stages on Life’s Way, somewhat resemble novels. Moreover, 
part of the interpretative task of approaching a Kierkegaardian pseudonym involves 
engaging with that pseudonym‟s life-view, an experience not unlike engaging with a 
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literary character. In these and other ways, Kierkegaard appears to be a friend of 
narrative.  
 
However, I have grave reservations about one key connection that has recently been 
made between Kierkegaard and narrative: the attempted use of the MacIntyre-inspired 
idea of “narrative unity” and related notions to distinguish the aesthetic and ethical 
spheres of life in Either-Or. In investigating this, I shall argue that the term 
“narrative” is simply not up to the task required of it by a number of commentators, 
such as Anthony Rudd. Rudd claims that Judge William‟s argument for the ethical life 
in Either-Or can be understood in terms of MacIntyrean “narrative unity”. In section 
I, I consider Rudd‟s case. I argue that Judge William‟s argument in fact contains far 
more in the way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated in the idea 
of “narrative unity”, and that the MacIntyrean idea that narratives confer intelligibility 
will not enable us to distinguish a Kierkegaardian aesthete from a Kierkegaardian 
ethicist. In section II, I argue that once we investigate more closely MacIntyre‟s use of 
the notion of narrative, we shall see that there are further problems in store for a 
MacIntyre-inspired defence of the idea of “narrative unity”. These include problems 
arising from MacIntyre‟s failure to distinguish between literary narratives and the 
“enacted dramatic narratives” of which he claims our lives consist; the unclarity of the 
idea of a “whole life”; and the threat of self-deception. Finally, in section III, I turn 
from problems with understanding the notion of “narrative unity” itself to a 
consideration of the wider question of whether unity and harmony really are as 
desirable in a human life as many suppose. In doing so, I focus on the connections 
John Davenport has drawn between Kierkegaardian choice and Harry Frankfurt‟s 
work on volitional identification. In criticising Frankfurt and Davenport, I take up a 
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suggestion by Philip Quinn, who points out the potential for psychological 
oversimplification in self-understanding that attends a stress on unity and harmony. In 
aiming to continue Quinn‟s line of thought, I draw on work by Martha Nussbaum, 
amongst others. 
 
I. Narrative and Judge William’s case for the ethical 
 
In their introduction to Kierkegaard After MacIntyre Davenport and Rudd say that 
they “discern a convergence towards a new consensus on what Kierkegaard meant by 
authentic „self-choice‟ in Either/Or, and on the way in which Kierkegaard conceives 
of ethical selfhood generally”.4 One key dimension of this is that Kierkegaard‟s 
“understanding of the development of ethical personality involves a quest for 
narrative unity”.5 Of all the contributors to the volume, the commentator who gives 
the most clearly central role to the notion of “narrative unity” or “narrative structure” 
in his account of Either-Or is probably Anthony Rudd, so it is this aspect of Rudd‟s 
argument that I shall consider here.  
 
Rudd argues that Kierkegaard‟s aim is to show “how a rational appeal might be made 
to the disengaged or ironic modern self … to reengage with tradition”.6 He claims that 
the argument for the ethical life in Either-Or is effectively the same as MacIntyre‟s 
argument for his narrative conception of the self in chapter 15 of After Virtue.
7
 If true, 
this would be ironic, given MacIntyre‟s infamous objection to Kierkegaard in that 
text. MacIntyre presents the Kierkegaard of Either-Or as an irrationalist: as claiming 
that the only justification for the move from the aesthetic sphere of existence 
(represented by the rootless young man A) to the ethical sphere (represented by Judge 
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William) is criterionless choice. On MacIntyre‟s story, Kierkegaard is a critical figure 
in the breakdown of “the Enlightenment‟s attempt to discover an independent rational 
justification for morality”, and Either-Or is “a book which is at once the outcome and 
the epitaph”8 of this attempt. This reading of Kierkegaard as an irrationalist has 
rightly received numerous rebuttals from Kierkegaard scholars, but according to 
several such commentators, Kierkegaard could be more of an ally for MacIntyre‟s 
project than the latter realises.
9
 Rudd glosses his claim that A‟s life constitutes 
“despair” because it has “no principle of unity” in MacIntyrean terms: A‟s, he tells us, 
is “a life which lacks a narrative structure”.10  
 
What should we say about this appeal to notions such as “narrative structure” and 
“narrative unity” to try to explain the argument of Either-Or? A large part of the 
problem with talk of “narrative” in general is the variety of ways in which the term 
gets defined (when it is defined at all).
11
 In light of these varying uses of the term, 
contributors to the “Kierkegaard after MacIntyre” debate need to be clearer about 
what they mean when they use it.
12
 Several write as if MacIntyre‟s use of the term 
was clear and uncontentious but - as I shall argue in section II - it is not. In addition, 
in order for the debate about narrative to be of much interest at all, I take it that the 
term must be used in a non-trivial manner. As Galen Strawson puts it, “if someone 
says … that making coffee is a narrative … because you have to think ahead, do 
things in the right order, and so on, and that everyday life involves many such 
narratives, then I take it that the claim is trivial.”13  
 
What could be meant, then, by the “narrative structure” of a life? Consider Rudd‟s 
claim in more detail:  
 6 
For the ethicist, life has meaning because it is directed towards the 
achievement of goals, which themselves lead on in intelligible ways to further 
projects at which she may succeed or fail. To understand any action is to 
situate it in a context which renders it intelligible, and that context is itself 
rendered intelligible by the wider narrative of the agent‟s life to which it 
contributes. Our lives make sense to us as long as we can tell ourselves an 
intelligible story about who we are and what we are doing. To lack such a 
narrative structure in one‟s life is to lack any stable sense of personal identity, 
any sense of oneself as enduring through time as the same person, as one who 
can be the bearer of obligations and entitlements. The aesthete‟s life reduces 
to a series of moments, pleasurable or unpleasurable, but with no principle of 
unity discernable in them. Furthermore, the ethicist recognises that the 
projects and commitments which define her identity are themselves socially 
defined, and require engagement with – though not uncritical acceptance of – 
the traditions which give that society its sense of identity and coherence, 
which define what is characteristic about its way of life.
14
  
 
At this point, I should add an important note of clarification. In what follows, I shall 
understand the term “aesthete”, as do both Rudd and Davenport, as the default 
position for anyone who has not embraced the ethical or any higher Kierkegaardian 
existence-sphere (some form of the religious).
15
 This is important for two reasons. 
First, it reminds us that there is, in Davenport‟s words, “no Archimedean point 
outside”16 the existence-spheres. But second – a point often overlooked, but to which I 
shall return later in this section - it means that we cannot dismiss the aesthetic life in 
general on the basis of the particularities of A. Most commentators would 
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acknowledge that there is more to aestheticism than is embodied in the rootless young 
man of whose writings the bulk of the first volume of Either-Or consists. The 
varieties of the aesthetic life discussed in that volume range from the “immediate” raw 
sensuousness of Mozart‟s Don Giovanni to the reflective manipulator Johannes, the 
author of the “Seducer‟s Diary”. As we shall see later in this section, Judge William 
also considers lives devoted to wealth, glory, nobility or the development of an 
exceptional talent to be varieties of aestheticism. Yet despite all this, commentators 
sometimes proceed as if A‟s occasional acknowledgment of his own despair suffices 
as a refutation of the aesthetic life in general. This conclusion is far too hasty.  
 
Returning to the above quote from Rudd, note its focus on intelligibility. For Rudd, it 
seems that a key function of any narrative is to make something more intelligible. 
(This could be a way of distinguishing a narrative from a mere chronicle of events.) 
Perhaps one could argue, therefore, that “life narratives” are attempts to make our 
lives more intelligible.  
 
Now, this focus on intelligibility is very much in the spirit of MacIntyre, who argues 
that the concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an 
action as such (unintelligible actions being “failed candidates for the status of 
intelligible action”.17) MacIntyre‟s general point is that agents and actions cannot be 
understood atomistically. For me to understand your actions and intentions, I must 
locate them in a temporal and social context, rather than viewing them as 
unconnected, isolated events. An apparently unintelligible action can become 
intelligible by “finding its place in a narrative”.18 MacIntyre‟s memorable example of 
this is a young man who approaches a stranger at a bus stop and says: “The name of 
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the common wild duck is Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus”. This apparently 
unintelligible action – the sentence itself is perfectly intelligible, but what was the 
young man‟s purpose in uttering it? – becomes intelligible once we realise that he has 
mistaken the stranger for someone who approached him in the library earlier and 
asked him if by chance he knew the Latin name of the common wild duck. Or that he 
has just come from a session with his psychotherapist, who is trying to remedy his 
shyness by encouraging him to talk to strangers (“But what shall I say?” “Oh, 
anything at all.”19)  
 
I have no real quarrel with MacIntyre‟s basic point here. But in the context of Either-
Or, the introduction of intelligibility is problematic. For rather few of us cannot tell 
ourselves an intelligible story about who we are and what we are doing. Granted, 
there are occasions in life when we ask ourselves what the point is of that to which we 
have devoted our time: those occasions on which, to a certain kind of person, 
questions about the very purpose or “meaning” of one‟s life may occur. But even in 
such moments – which are relatively rare - intelligibility is not the issue. When my 
wife has left me, my teenage daughter has told me she‟ll never speak to me again, and 
I have lost my job, all in the same week, I might well face despair in a more everyday 
sense than Kierkegaard‟s. But even in such circumstances, I would be able to offer a 
perfectly intelligible narrative about why I married this woman; why I intervened to 
try and discourage my daughter from dating that Neanderthal suspected drug-pusher; 
why I took that job despite my knowledge of its insecurity. Intelligibility is not the 
problem. The point that matters in the Kierkegaardian context is that the concept of 
intelligibility will certainly not enable us to distinguish aesthetes from ethicists. As 
mentioned, Judge William discusses various aesthetes whose lives are devoted to 
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wealth, glory, nobility or the development of a talent. Whatever the shortcomings of 
such lives, the issue is not that they are unintelligible. If we are to condemn such 
figures, it will have to be on some quite different basis to this. Yet, pace Rudd, this is 
precisely what Judge William does. For instance, consider the contrast the Judge 
draws between the aesthetic view of talent as something accidental (which 
distinguishes the person who has it from the person who hasn‟t), and the ethical view 
of talent as a calling (something everyone has, according to the Judge, and which 
therefore does not distinguish the brilliant pianist from any other human being in any 
fundamental sense
20
).
21
 
 
Overall, my claim is that Judge William‟s argument contains far more in the way of 
substantive normative claims than can be boiled down to talk of the “narrative 
structure” or “narrative unity” of a life.  It is certainly true that central to it is an 
insistence on the need for commitment to what Rudd calls “projects”, but there is far 
more. First and foremost is the Judge‟s belief in God. He does at one point claim that 
“what is important in choosing is not so much to choose the right thing as the energy, 
the earnestness and the pathos with which one chooses”,22 but he prefaces this with 
the words “if you are to understand me properly”, and insists that “even though a 
person chose the wrong thing, he nevertheless by virtue of the energy with which he 
chose, will discover that he chose the wrong thing”,23 since the inwardness of choice 
is such that the chooser is brought into contact with “the eternal power that 
omnipresently pervades all existence”.24 In other words, choose wrongly, and God 
will show you that you are wrong. This is hardly an uncontroversial claim. Yet it is 
but one of a range of substantive normative claims that the Judge makes. Others 
include that choosing oneself involves “receiving” or “accepting” oneself (thus 
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distinguishing his view of choice from that of Sartre, a point MacIntyre seems to 
overlook in After Virtue); that choosing oneself “absolutely” involves recognition of 
one‟s guilt and need for repentance;25 and that it is everyone‟s duty to marry26 and to 
work for a living.
27
 (Marriage, he also tells us, belongs properly to Christianity: 
pagans and Jews have failed to “perfect” it.28)  
 
All of this is part of the argument of part II of Either-Or. The Judge‟s accounts of 
receptivity, guilt and repentance are just as important a part of his argument as the 
case for choice and commitment. Any description of the argument in terms of an 
apparently neutral term like narrative, therefore, will underdescribe his extremely 
complex and contentious argument. To be fair to Rudd, he does recognise that for the 
Judge, ethical agency is rooted in the concrete life of a society. But as Rick Furtak has 
recently pointed out, on this view moral perception “takes place within a coherent 
system of ethical beliefs which define what is right and what is good”.29 How, then, 
can it appeal to the disengaged or ironic modern self” who “stands outside all 
traditions”?30 What is his incentive to respond to the Judge‟s plea to enter the water of 
bourgeois Christian marital domestic satisfaction? 
 
Rudd‟s answer is something like this. Kierkegaard, he claims, holds that “we share a 
desire for our lives to be coherent narratives, and it is the failure of the aesthetic to 
meet that desire which makes it rational to prefer the ethical to it”.31 He further claims 
that the aesthete‟s despair inheres in the lack of continuity in his life.32 But this 
doesn‟t answer the question about why we should value a life of dutiful work and 
conventional marriage over other possible manifestations of the ethical life. (After all, 
despair can arise within a marriage or career too.) Moreover, this will not demarcate 
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the aesthete from the ethicist, for at least two reasons. First, we need to understand the 
significance of the fact that A is actually a rather sophisticated kind of aesthete. Judge 
William recognises that there are great differences between individuals in the 
aesthetic sphere,
33
 and as we have noted, describes a variety of aesthetic lives that he 
clearly views as less sophisticated than A‟s. Those lives devoted to wealth, glory, 
nobility and the development of a special talent all count as aesthetic, and yet the 
Judge explicitly says that such views of life all have “a certain unity, a certain 
coherence”.34 They also, we might add, possess a certain continuity, insofar as they 
pursue a goal. It can‟t, therefore, be accurate to attempt to distinguish the aesthetic 
from the ethical in terms of unity or coherence per se.
35
 Second, as noted, boredom 
and despair might be precisely what results from the rather conventional life Judge 
William recommends. One suspects that A would “see through” this, and as Furtak 
argues, his failure to hold back from moral engagement need not necessarily be seen 
as a failure to “„grow up‟ and realise the universal”, but might stem from “a lofty 
conception of human dignity” that will not rest satisfied with the Judge‟s proposed 
solutions.
36
 Furtak calls A‟s desire for something different from the appropriation of 
accepted conventions “the virtue of the romantic imagination”, adding that if the 
aesthete “is to be denounced for his inability to form relationships, he should also be 
praised for criticizing his contemporaries in Socratic fashion, for caring about the 
wrong things.”37 As we have noted, Judge William‟s justification of the conventional 
values that underlie his own life are hardly going to satisfy A. So as Furtak suggests, 
perhaps A is “hindered not by a resistance to actuality as such, but by doubts about the 
values of a particular civilization”.38 
 
 12 
Rudd later seems to acknowledge this problem. He says that “someone with the 
disconcerting brilliance, radicalism, and individuality of „A‟ will not be able to find 
fulfilment in the enlightened but still rather blandly conventional morality preached 
by the Judge”.39 But he does not seem to see what damage this does to this part of his 
argument. Once this is admitted, in what sense has the Judge gone beyond A? To be 
sure, the Judge‟s recognition of the need for commitment in life is an important 
insight. But one suspects that A too has an important insight: that the Judge does not 
provide sufficient reasons for why we should commit to what he commits to, that in 
important respects he mistakes the local for the universal. How - without begging the 
question - are we to decide which of these insights trumps the other? Rudd compares 
this case with one in which rival scientific theories can both “give an account of what 
they see that is formally consistent with their theoretical principles, but [where] one of 
these accounts may be very strained, over-complex, and depend on a mass of ad hoc 
auxiliary hypotheses, while the other is simple, straightforward, and fits easily with 
the rest of the theory”.40 But this comparison will not do, as it fails to give due credit 
to the significance of the insight we can reasonably suppose someone with A‟s 
intelligence to have into the weak points in the Judge‟s case.  
 
Kierkegaard himself was clearly aware of these weaknesses. Indeed, an early critic of 
Judge William was Johannes Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Kierkegaard‟s 
Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Climacus argues 
that the Judge‟s account of despair reveals that he fails to take on board how radical is 
the human dependence upon God. As Climacus puts it: “In despairing I use myself to 
despair, and therefore I can indeed despair of everything by myself, but if I do this I 
cannot come back by myself. It is in this moment of decision that the individual needs 
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divine assistance”.41 Alastair Hannay glosses this as follows: “properly to despair is to 
give up the idea of there being any human platform from which, or any procedure 
whereby, to establish one‟s kinship in thought and action with God”.42 
 
Relatedly, several commentators have also argued that the Judge also has an 
inadequate understanding of sin and repentance. Robert L. Perkins, for example, notes 
that the Judge operates without a sense that the awareness of the need for repentance 
is brought about by divine grace,
43
 and that his understanding of repentance is thus 
“fatally flawed”.44 Perkins draws attention to the following passage:  
 
It is the sign of a well brought up child to be inclined to say it is sorry without 
too much pondering whether it is in the right or not, and it is likewise a sign of a 
high-minded person and a deep soul if he is inclined to repent, if he does not 
take God to court but repents and loves God in his repentance.
45
 
 
Perkins argues that in basing repentance upon an inclination, the Judge effectively 
“uses the same basis for life as the aesthete”.46  
 
In respect of all this, I conclude that, in spite of the flaws of the aesthetic life, Rudd 
has not succeeded in showing that the ethical as defended by Judge William genuinely 
is an advance on the aesthetic. Rudd certainly recognises that there are limits to the 
Judge‟s position,47 but he still seems to suppose that the position the Judge represents 
is a clear move in the right direction (albeit an incomplete one). What I am arguing is 
that unless we can give a reason for why the Judge‟s insight trumps A‟s, we have no 
clear grounds for this conclusion.  
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Rudd also recognises the possibility that an aesthete may not be convinced by the 
Judge‟s case. However, he claims, in such a case the ethicist will judge the aesthete as 
“a victim of false consciousness, someone who will not acknowledge his own nature 
because he is frightened by the demands that this might impose upon him. But the 
ethicist will not suppose that his inability to convert the aesthete shows that his own 
views are wrong – he finds his way of life justified by the way in which it satisfies the 
need he feels for narrative structure in his life.”48 This response will not do. For here 
we have switched from the question motivating MacIntyre – which concerns an 
aesthete‟s judgement about his own life, and whether he could make the “leap” from it 
without already having “become ethical”  – to a quite different question as to what the 
ethicist thinks of the aesthetic life. That is not the point at issue at all. Moreover, for 
the reasons given above, it would be just as reasonable to condemn Judge William as 
the victim of false consciousness as it would to pass this verdict on an aesthete. We 
might well see the Judge as someone “frightened by the demands” that a genuinely 
religious life – a life of poverty and adversity that, Kierkegaard claims, no human 
being would naturally choose to live
49
 - places upon him. From Kierkegaard‟s 
ultimate standpoint, the Judge‟s confidence in the degree of autonomy we can enjoy is 
a large part of the problem: the degree of control that he implies we can have over our 
lives is largely illusory. In this sense, the despairing aesthete may even be closer to the 
religious than is Judge William.
50
 Rudd thus begs the question at issue when he goes 
on to say: “The fact that one may not be able to argue an aesthete out of his 
aestheticism does not make aestheticism a rational option. After all, one may also fail 
to argue a stubborn and consistent flat-Earther … out of their beliefs; but that doesn‟t 
make them rational.”51 This response will not do at all, since Rudd has not provided 
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us with any good reason to accept the comparison of what the Judge calls “aesthetic 
earnestness” with belief in a flat Earth.52 
 
Rudd also utilises the most common argument against the aesthetic, which trades on 
A‟s mostly tacit, but sometimes explicit, awareness of his own despair. There are two 
problems with this. First, as noted, it illegitimately dismisses all varieties of the 
aesthetic life on the basis of dismissing A. The Judge describes A‟s life as “despair 
itself”, and this, in his view, is the highest vantage point the aesthetic life can attain, in 
that it has “seen through the vanity of everything, but … not gone further”.53 (This 
latter point is, for the Judge, its crucial flaw.) Yet – and this is the second point - 
Kierkegaard‟s view of despair (discussed at length in The Sickness Unto Death, 
authored by the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus) ultimately rests on a certain 
kind of Christian anthropology to the effect that all varieties of human life short of 
Christian faith count as instances of despair. Once we have noted this, it becomes 
relatively uninteresting to note that A specifically is in despair – or, indeed, that 
aesthetes more generally are. Indeed, Rudd himself shows how Judge William‟s 
position is likely to end up in despair too.
54
  
 
Let us recap the argument so far. Can the limitations of the aesthetic life be captured 
by the idea that its “narrative” is incoherent or unintelligible? No. While agreeing 
with Rudd on the by now standard view that MacIntyre‟s “criterionless choice” 
objection is misconceived, I have argued, contra Rudd, that Judge William‟s argument 
for the ethical contains far more in the way of substantive normative content than can 
be encapsulated in the idea of “narrative unity” or “narrative structure”. The meaning 
of the term “narrative” is far from clear, but that aspect which Rudd places centre-
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stage – the MacIntyrean claim that narratives confer intelligibility – will not enable us 
to distinguish a Kierkegaardian aesthete from a Kierkegaardian ethicist. This is 
because the objection that the aesthetic life, in all its varieties, is unintelligible is 
misplaced. We have not been told exactly why fissured, fragmented narratives are 
ipso facto incoherent or unintelligible. But nor have we been shown that an aesthetic 
life necessarily is fissured and fragmented, as the Judge‟s acknowledgment that there 
are aesthetic lives possessing a kind of unity and coherence recognises. To judge a life 
as morally shabby or as failing to realise its telos is not – at least, not without 
considerable further argument – the same as judging it as incoherent or 
unintelligible.
55
 
 
However, suppose the following response were to be offered on behalf of Rudd (or, 
indeed, any MacIntyrean Kierkegaardian): “You claim that the term „narrative‟ is 
vague, and too broad to be of much use. But what I mean by „narrative‟ and „narrative 
unity‟ is essentially what MacIntyre means by those terms. Understand that, and you 
will better understand my position.” 
 
In the following section, I shall take up this challenge. I shall argue that if we do look 
in more detail at MacIntyre on narrative, we shall come across even more problems 
with the “narrative unity” view than we have noticed hitherto. Those problems, in 
brief, are as follows. First, by taking literary narratives as the default kind of narrative, 
MacIntyre offers a misleading guide to understanding human life. Second, our very 
status as temporal beings, far from supporting the “narrative unity” view, resists the 
idea that any human life could be “unified” or “whole”, leaving it very unclear what 
MacIntyre means when he talks about the importance of having a sense of one‟s 
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“whole life”. Third, there are always multiple, possibly radically inconsistent, 
narratives that could be told of any significant event. This throws up the important 
problem of self-deception. What justifies the selection one makes of the material that 
goes to make up the “narrative” of one‟s life? How can we be confident that we are 
not just telling stories of our lives that are, in Quinn‟s words, “retrospective 
illusions”? Let us consider each of these issues in turn.  
 
II. Deeper into MacIntyre on narrative: life, literature, temporality and self-
deception 
 
As previously mentioned, I have no quarrel with MacIntyre‟s observation that an 
apparently unintelligible utterance can become intelligible by embedding it in a wider 
context or “narrative”. The real problems with his account of “narrative” arise, as 
Peter Lamarque has recently pointed out, when MacIntyre starts to take literary 
narrative as the default kind of narrative. In a discussion of conversations, he claims 
that “we allocate conversations to genres, just as we do literary narratives”.56 
Conversations are “dramatic narratives” in which “the participants are not only the 
actors, but also the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the mode 
of their production”.57 Like literary works, conversations have beginnings, middles 
and ends; many of them have digressions and subplots. But this is true also of 
“battles, chess games, courtships, philosophy seminars”, and so on. Thus, MacIntyre 
concludes, conversations in particular and human actions in general are “enacted 
narratives”.58 
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Lamarque is right that MacIntyre‟s use of literary narrative as the guide to 
understanding human life is misleading. To see why, consider first MacIntyre‟s 
suggestion that in writing the biography of a life, we need first to ask to what genre it 
belongs. (In order to write the life of Thomas Beckett, he insists, we would need to 
know that it properly belonged to the genre of tragedy rather than hagiography or 
saga.
59
) Two questions arise here. First, exactly what is involved in judging a life as a 
tragedy? John Christman suggests that the life of a completely dissociated personality 
could count as an example of such.
60
 Or, if we define tragedy more traditionally, such 
that it is a narrative in which a person with some tragic flaw “suffers a final fatal 
misfortune”, then “the condition of narrativity will be too demanding to account 
adequately for the variety of lives that real people tend to live”.61 Second and more 
fundamentally, why suppose that it is appropriate to allot human lives to such fictional 
genres at all? Even if this were an appropriate question for the biographer, it hardly 
seems so to anyone trying to get clear on her own “life narrative”. Judging my life as 
a tragedy on the basis of critical aspects of it to date may well prevent me from seeing 
ways in which possibilities open to me right now prevent its continuing along such a 
trajectory. And it is not clear how this talk of allotting a life to a given genre in order 
to know how to write it is consistent with MacIntyre‟s later claim that “it is crucial 
that at any given point in an enacted dramatic narrative we do not know what will 
happen next”.62 Could my life change genre at any moment, then? This seems a 
strange basis on which to build an account of stable selfhood.  
 
It is worth noting that in distinguishing his position from MacIntyre‟s, another 
significant narrative theorist, Paul Ricoeur, criticises MacIntyre on just this point of 
being misled by using literary narratives as his model. MacIntyre, argues Ricoeur, 
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“does not attach any decisive importance … to the split between literary fictions and 
the stories he says are enacted”.63 For instance, although for MacIntyre a life cannot 
be successful or complete unless it can “be grasped as a singular totality”,64 Ricoeur 
points out that this is problematic: whereas novels have beginnings and ends, “there is 
nothing in real life that serves as a narrative beginning; memory is lost in the hazes of 
early childhood; my birth and, with greater reason, the act through which I was 
conceived belong more to the history of others – in this case, to my parents – than to 
me. As for my death, it will finally be recounted only in the stories of those who 
survive me. I am always moving toward my death, and this prevents me from ever 
grasping it as a narrative end.”65  
 
This connects with our second point. In similar vein, Stephen Mulhall has recently 
argued that our status as temporal beings resists any idea of human existence as 
unified or whole, because of our being-ahead-of-ourselves. We relate ourselves to 
what is not yet, coming to an end only at death. MacIntyre treats death rather 
brusquely as the end of the narrative of a given life. Against a critic who objects that 
“life has no beginnings, middles or ends” – the point being the essentially Sartrean 
one that we impose such significance on life retrospectively – MacIntyre responds 
that “one is tempted to reply, „But have you never heard of death?‟”.66 But Mulhall 
argues, in parallel with Ricoeur, that it is precisely death that poses a problem for 
MacIntyre‟s narrative conception of the self. If my death is necessarily not an event in 
my life, I cannot grasp it as an episode in the story of my life. My death can be 
experienced only from a perspective outside my life: it can be an event in the lives of 
the descendants and friends I leave behind and the drunken driver who ran me over, 
but not in mine. So MacIntyre‟s “concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of 
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a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end”67 
needs to be handled with great care, since the one person whose unified “life 
narrative” I can‟t in principle have access to is my own.  
 
Moreover, Mulhall points out that “to take oneself as one‟s own intentional object is 
to take up another state of oneself”.68 When I am watching a particularly good soccer 
match, I can get thoroughly absorbed in the action, and entirely unaware of being so 
absorbed. But I can suddenly be made aware of this absorption by the person over 
whose shoes I am spilling coffee because I started pouring before my attention was 
distracted by the beginning of Thierry Henry‟s mazy run. When this is pointed out to 
me, I can make the fact of my absorption a new object of consciousness, but in doing 
so, I take up another state of myself, relegating my previous state to my past. The 
point here is that one can be conscious of oneself only as one was, not as one is. Thus 
as Mulhall puts it, “the phenomenon of self-consciousness … condemns the self to 
non-self-identity, to a necessary inability to coincide with itself, to gather itself up as a 
whole into its own awareness”.69 More prosaically, let us say this: when I reflect on 
my life at any given point and try and make sense of it as a unity (whatever that turns 
out to mean), I must necessarily leave out the future in an important sense. The future 
is both a crucial part of my life, as Heidegger stresses, and yet always a threat to 
whatever “unity” I may have achieved. Of course, there is one circumstance in which 
this is not true: the point at which I have no future. But unfortunately, this is the point 
at which I am dead, and so the issue of the “narrative unity” of my life cannot by that 
point be an issue for me at all. In Mulhall‟s words, “the self necessarily transcends 
any narrative it might be in a position to tell about itself, since any such narrative will 
always fail to include the moment of its own narrating, and the inclusion of that 
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moment will necessarily fail to include the moment in or through which it is included, 
and so endlessly on”.70 Thus, he concludes, “any adequate conception of the self as a 
narrative unity must acknowledge that the self simultaneously and necessarily resists 
subsumption in a unified narrative.”71 
 
It is worth noting that Kierkegaard himself reaches essentially the same conclusion. In 
a famous journal entry, he observes:  
Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backwards. 
But then one forgets the other clause – that it must be lived forwards. The more 
one thinks through this clause, the more one concludes that life in temporality 
never becomes properly understandable, simply because never at any time does 
one get perfect repose to take a stance: backwards.
72
 
 
Despite this, Macintyre talks about the need to understand the narrative of one‟s 
“whole life”. Yet, as well as the points above, what justifies supposing that I have any 
right to think that my life as a whole will, at any given point, consist of a well-ordered 
story with a perspicuously viewable “shape”? As Christman points out, “most 
people‟s lives consist of entirely separable projects and goals which, though each has 
an internal organizing aim, fail to interconnect in a grand scheme”.73 Christman‟s 
point here, I take it, is not that I do not need to decide how to balance the demands of 
work and family commitments, for example, in my life. It is rather that I should not 
necessarily feel any obligation to bring each and every aspect of my life under one 
grand narrative. For example, my life is ethically none the worse for the fact that I 
have given little if any thought to the question of how to “unify” my life qua gardener 
with my life qua soccer fan. (Except in the utterly trivial sense that I can‟t tend the 
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roses while at the game.) Yet any account of my “whole life” – unless that phrase 
turns out to mean vastly less than it promises – will have to take such factors into 
account. In telling the story of any given life, Christman adds, we can certainly posit 
“final purposes to which all our training and experiences inexorably lead. But these 
are (mostly) the stuff of fanciful biographers rather than plausible structural accounts 
of everyday lives”.74 Fanciful biographers or, we might add, looking ahead to the 
issue of self-deception, fanciful autobiographers.  
 
Exactly what Macintyre means by a “whole life”, then, is unclear. He discusses 
criteria for “success or failure in a human life as a whole” in terms of a “narrative 
quest”, and asserts that “[t]he unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest”.75 
The answer to his own question – “A quest for what?” – is that no quest could begin 
without a telos, and so that in construing a life as a quest, some conception of the 
good for man is needed. On the other hand, the medieval conception of the quest is 
not a case of searching “for something already adequately characterized, as miners 
search for gold”.76 Only through undertaking the quest is its goal finally to be 
understood, and so a quest “is always an education both as to the character of that 
which is sought and in self-knowledge”.77  
 
But this still leaves obscure at what point in my life I could say that its “quest” 
becomes clear to me. Perhaps never, since Macintyre‟s conclusion about the good life 
for man is that it is “the life spent in seeking for the good life for man”.78 And this, as 
Rudd himself notes, sounds “disappointingly empty”.79  
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The impact of this discussion of one‟s “whole life” on Rudd is as follows. Rudd 
claims that we ask ourselves “Do I, on reflection, find my life to be meaningful, find 
that it embodies a coherent narrative?”80 and suggests that “when we can find no 
coherent narrative structure in our own lives, we feel lost – despairing, even”.81 But 
only in extreme cases of crisis in life, surely, are we likely to ask such questions of 
our lives as a whole. And such occasions are rare: many seem to go through life 
without ever facing such a crisis. Far more common is to ask a related question in 
respect of some aspect of one‟s life, such as when faced with a decision as to whether 
or not to accept a new job, or to continue with (or bail out from) a romantic 
relationship. And while it is true that such aspects of life cannot be separated off from 
others (MacIntyre‟s point about the atomistic), this is still not a question about the 
meaning of my life as such (still less “life” as such). It is far from obvious that 
questions such as “Should I accept that job in Arizona?” or “Should I get back 
together with Sarah?” need necessarily lead me to a question as large as “Is my life 
meaningful?” There is an important difference between asking whether particular 
aspects of a life hang together, and of whether a “whole life” does, and the former 
experience is far more common than the latter.
82
  
 
Moreover, the fact that I hesitate to construct an overall narrative of my “whole life” 
in no way implies that I lack substantial projects and ethical commitments, or that I 
cannot tell a coherent story about those projects and commitments (including how 
they hang together). Yet as Lamarque points out, “only in the rarest of cases – full 
biographies or autobiographies – do individual narratives offer anything like a 
comprehensive coverage of whole lives. Few people even attempt to tell the complete 
story of their lives … Yet if the unity of a life somehow depends on the unity of a 
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narrative then most lives will turn out to have no such unity because there is no such 
narrative”.83 
 
In summary, then, because I am a temporal being who relates myself to the future, no 
narrative I could ever tell about my “whole life” could ever fully make it a “unity” in 
any full and robust sense of the term. Thus it is unclear what MacIntyre‟s talk of one‟s 
“whole life” could mean. Talk of a “narrative quest” is similarly obscure, since it is 
not clear at what point in my life I could ever say that its quest had definitively 
become clear to me. But having an account of the narrative of one‟s “whole life” is 
simply not necessary in order to make sense of the projects and commitments in our 
lives.  
 
This brings us to the third problem with MacIntyre‟s talk of “narrative unity”: 
indeterminacy and self-deception. Lamarque puts the problem thus:  
the very theory of narrative undercuts the aspiration of life-wide unity, given 
that narratives are characterised by their perspectival nature. For important 
sequences of events most people have more than one narrative to tell. All of 
us return to the major events in our lives and recount them over and over in 
different narratives from different points of view. The whole idea of unity 
and coherence crumbles away. The more important the event the more 
perspectives it invites, thus the more narratives we relate, often in conflict 
with each other. … Fragments of narrative, sometimes in conflict with each 
other, are no basis for an account of personal identity or the unity of a life. 
The impression given by the term “narrative” is of a complete, rounded 
story with a beginning, middle and end that helps make sense of complex 
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events. The model is historical narrative or the complex narratives of fiction. 
But personal narratives virtually never attain completeness, closure or 
unity… a misleading paradigm is invoked.84 
 
This throws up a very important challenge that any narrative conception of the self 
must face: the problem of self-deception. What if the stories we tell about our lives 
are, in Quinn‟s words, “retrospective illusions”85? As Quinn points out, there is plenty 
of room for “self-interested misunderstanding, rationalization, and mythologization” 
in respect of our own lives. This could either take the form of replacing an 
“unflattering unified narrative” with “one that feeds our self-esteem”, or (for someone 
sympathetic to Rudd‟s position) to our constructing such a narrative precisely to 
assuage the fear that “our lives really lack narrative unity all the way down and are, to 
that extent, without meaning”.86 In selecting the material for our life narratives, what 
justifies the selection?
87
  
 
Interestingly, Kierkegaard‟s conception of the aesthetic life nicely illustrates this very 
point. Jeffrey Turner has argued that Kierkegaard is aware of the seductive danger of 
the aesthetic in a way that “narrative theorists or … commentators on MacIntyre”88 
have overlooked. Turner argues that the desire to “tell a good tale” about our lives 
renders us prone to various kinds of self-deception as we try to convince ourselves 
that our lives are more beautiful or interesting than they really are.
89
 We are, in 
MacIntyre‟s famous phrase, “story telling animals”, and none of us wants to tell 
stories about ourselves that are dull or ugly. However, this leads Turner to make the 
strange claim that “a minimal condition of the moral truth of the stories we tell about 
ourselves might well be that they can‟t be boring”.90 This strikes me as a serious 
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wrong turning, for what has the truth of a story has got to do with its interest-value? 
Turner‟s claim that we “cannot help but desire to tell and hear interesting and 
beautiful tales”91 should surely be seen as a potentially self-deception sponsoring 
problem, rather than something to which we need to accede.  
 
For instance, consider someone who tells the following story:  
“The reason I have so often been unfaithful to my wife is because fidelity is 
just fundamentally at odds with my character. I am a creative artist, and live 
much of my life in a state of intense creative tension. The mundane rules of 
conventional morality can hardly be thought to apply to someone like me, 
whose Art would suffer if contained by such bourgeois notions of propriety. 
Yes, my wife gets hurt, and yes, that‟s regrettable. But she has learned to 
deal with it; indeed, having to face these pitfalls has strengthened her 
character. We have come to see her turning a blind eye as a way in which 
she contributes to my Art.”  
To this, someone might reply:  
“No, the reason you have often been unfaithful to your wife is that you are 
an immature, libidinous old rake who, faced with an attractive and available 
younger woman, is constitutionally incapable of keeping your trousers on.”  
Now, note that the second, more straightforward story is probably less “interesting” 
than the former; it is certainly less “beautiful”. But neither of these facts in any way 
detracts from the likelihood, in a given case, of the second story being closer to the 
truth. 
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The above reveals an important danger for which anyone holding a narrative view of 
selfhood needs to be on the look-out: the danger of conflating the quality of a life with 
the quality of the narrative of that life. Yet fiction provides us with plenty of 
examples of wasted, worthless or downright evil lives that make for valuable, rich and 
fascinating narratives.
92
 So the question that arises for MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians 
is as follows. Why should we consider that my ability to give a “structure” or “unity” 
to my life by telling myself (or you) a story about how its component features hang 
together mean that the unity thus imparted is in any way genuine?
93
  
In asking myself whether my life possesses narrative unity, I shall be waging a 
perennial battle against self-deception. What compounds this problem is the fact that 
establishing truth in respect of narrative is a tricky business. I can offer you an 
account of my life that contains not a single falsehood. And yet the overall narrative 
can still be false and dishonest, insofar as it offers a bowdlerised version of events: for 
instance, in R. G. Collingwood‟s words, its “omissions” may be “falsifications”.94 
In summary, then, what is the impact of these criticisms of MacIntyre on Rudd and 
any other Macintyrean Kierkegaardian who would argue along similar lines? First, 
they do not, of course, in and of themselves render talk of “narrative” null and void: 
Ricoeur‟s criticisms of MacIntyre do not prevent him from continuing to talk of his 
own position in terms of narrative. But the first question for Rudd is this. In saying 
that the Judge‟s argument in Either-Or is essentially the same as chapter 15 of After 
Virtue, and endorsing the Judge as having made an important advance on the aesthetic 
life, just how much of MacIntyre‟s argument in that chapter is he endorsing? For the 
latter argument contains not just the reasonable point that something initially 
unintelligible might be made more intelligible by embedding it within a wider context 
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or narrative, but also – for instance - the conflation of lived human lives with literary 
narratives and the treatment of those lives as if they belonged to genres, claims 
nowhere to be found in Either-Or part II. Second, it is unclear exactly what 
MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians mean to endorse in respect of the “unity” part of the 
“narrative unity” formula. For a temporal being to attain a strong, “complete” unity in 
her life is impossible, for Ricoeur‟s and Mulhall‟s reasons. There is, of course, a far 
more minimal sense of unity. However fragmented my life, it is a unity in the minimal 
sense that is in some sense “mine”. Even the most radical schizophrenic, one of whose 
multiple personalities seizes the reins every ten minutes, can probably still give a 
name when his psychiatrist‟s secretary tries to book him in for his next session. In 
other words, the narrative of any individual life is necessarily a unity in some sense. 
But insofar as even a schizophrenic, let alone a Kierkegaardian aesthete, possesses 
“unity” in this sense, such a sense of unity is clearly too minimal to do any useful 
work for the MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians” case. So the question is this. Exactly 
where on this continuum do they see their sense of “unity” as sitting? Until I know 
what kind of “unity” is intended, it is impossible to judge to what extent my (or any 
other) life has at any given point attained it. And this lack of clarity is fuel to the fire 
of self-deception. Since MacIntyre‟s argument conflates literature and life in a 
misleading way; seems to trade on a conception of the unity of a life that is at best 
obscure, at worst incoherent; and fails to address the self-deception problem, how 
much of this argument is Rudd signing up to?
 95
 
 
Let us pause to note two further things before moving on. First, we have noted above 
that self-deception is a real problem for the “narrative unity” position. Yet a key part 
of Rudd‟s charge against A is, in effect, that he is self-deceived. (Recall the 
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comparison of the aesthete with “a stubborn and consistent flat-Earther”.) Once again, 
then, it is not clear how an appeal to “narrative unity” allows us to advance any 
further than the aesthete. A corollary of this is that we should be sceptical of Judge 
William‟s allegation that A is “always afraid of continuity, chiefly because it deprives 
you of the chance to delude yourself”.96 In fact, there is no reason to suppose, just 
because my life has far more continuity than A‟s, that I am free from the dangers of 
self-delusion. Indeed, if Quinn is right, seeing more continuity in my life than is really 
there might be precisely one form that this self-delusion takes. Once again 
Kierkegaard himself seems well aware of this problem. In For Self-Examination, 
recommending “earnestness”, he glosses this as a “kind of honest distrust of 
oneself”.97  
 
Second, consider briefly an objection that might be raised at this point. Readers of 
Kierkegaard might be wondering why I have not appealed to that text in which he 
most explicitly discusses the notion of personal “unity”, namely the “upbuilding 
discourse” commonly referred to as Purity of Heart.98 This is because the kind of 
unity Kierkegaard valorises in that text will not help the MacIntyrean Kierkegaardian 
case. Such unity is not “narrative unity”, insofar as narrative unity focuses upon our 
nature as temporal beings. But according to Purity of Heart, which persistently 
downgrades the temporal in relation to the eternal,
99
 the reason that “In truth to will 
one thing can … mean only to will the good”100 is that only “the good”, a term that 
Purity of Heart tends to equate with “the eternal”, is an “essential” unity. “To will one 
thing”, Kierkegaard insists, “cannot mean to will that which by nature is not one 
thing”.101 As Jeremy Walker glosses this, “all temporal existence, and therefore all 
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actual objects of the will, must be mere contingent unities – if they are unities at 
all”.102 Thus the essential unity valorised by Purity of Heart is not narrative unity. 
 
III. Unity, wholeheartedness and “missing the adventure” 
I turn now to a different line of objection to the case for “narrative unity”. In the 
previous section, we considered problems with the notion of “narrative unity” itself. 
In this third and final section, I shall raise a wider question. Even if the worries raised 
so far could be addressed, and a clear and coherent account of narrative unity given, 
just how desirable for a human life is unity and harmony? Turning my attention from 
Rudd to Davenport and his attempt to build on the work of Harry Frankfurt in a 
Kierkegaardian context, I shall argue for two claims. First, that Frankfurt and 
Davenport tend to exaggerate the degree to which we can anticipate and plan our 
futures. Second, that the desire for unity and wholeness brings with it an important 
danger: a certain kind of moral blindness. 
In response to some of his fellow contributors to Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, Philip 
Quinn has suggested that “narrative unity” (to the extent that we can make sense of 
the term) may not really be as desirable as its champions suppose. Quinn suggests that 
“relinquishing a certain amount of rational control over one‟s life in order to allow 
space in it for some disunity, either psychic or narrative, [is] a price worth paying to 
purchase opportunities to pursue plural but potentially conflicting goods if they are 
great enough.”103  
The danger to which Quinn points here is of being insufficiently aware of “the 
pressure to simplify by exclusion that the yearning for unity and wholeness puts on the 
ethical life”.104 There are at least two elements to this. The first is Quinn‟s concern 
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about “retrospective illusions”: that we often deceive others and ourselves by leaving 
out the details of our past life that don‟t fit the version of the story that we want to tell. 
The second concerns a prospective danger: that faced with a potentially life-changing 
decision, we might opt for the line of minimising risk and thus, in Cora Diamond‟s 
phrase, “miss the adventure” in life.105 Quinn suggests we need “to welcome plural 
values into our lives, risking the possibility of tragic conflict among them, and to 
manage the inevitable tensions as creatively and skillfully as we can”.106  I shall argue 
that this is right, and that supporters of narrative unity put too strong an emphasis on 
psychic harmony. Interestingly, in their editors‟ introduction, Davenport and Rudd 
remark: “There is surely something to the alternative picture Quinn presents, and we 
are indebted to him for prompting us to reconsider how we interpret the ideal form of 
the self”.107 
 
In an interesting pair of articles, Davenport has identified Kierkegaardian choice (of the kind 
that Judge William urges A to adopt) with Harry Frankfurt‟s notion of volitional 
identification.
108
 Frankfurt discusses a kind of “psychic instability or conflict” he labels 
“ambivalence” of the will.109 The person thus afflicted is prevented from “settling upon … any 
coherent affective or motivational identity”.110 In such a state, a person has unavoidably 
conflicting volitional tendencies that are internal to that person‟s will. Unlike (to use 
Frankfurt‟s example111) the unwilling addict sincerely struggling against drug addiction, who 
temporarily gives in to his craving for one more heroin fix and whose will is thus defeated, the 
ambivalent person‟s will is divided. Whereas the unwilling addict has a “higher order” desire to 
get off the stuff, the ambivalent person “does not know what he really wants”.112  
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Frankfurt opposes ambivalence to wholeheartedness: “A person is volitionally robust 
when he is wholehearted in his higher-order attitudes and inclinations, in his 
preferences and decisions”.113 In qualified but broad agreement, Davenport suggests:  
wholeheartedness … typically involves some readjustment of our different 
priorities, and sometimes the rejection of projects and ends incompatible with 
other commitments we find more important, until we have reinterpreted or 
refashioned our ground projects so that they are mutually reinforcing in spirit 
(rather than pulling in opposite directions), and so that they can all be pursued 
together (each in its proper respect) in one harmonious life.
114
  
He calls this the goal of “existential coherence”, and claims that “[a]ll mature human 
agents wholeheartedly will this sort of practical coherence in their life”.115 
 
One problem with this is that Frankfurt‟s and Davenport‟s picture operates at too great 
a level of generality. For Frankfurt, I am ambivalent if I am uncertain whether to be 
for or against “a certain psychic position”.116 But the level of abstract generality 
employed by Frankfurt‟s rather skeletal account makes it difficult to know exactly 
what he means by this. He accuses the ambivalent person of “a sort of incoherent 
greed – trying to have things both ways”.117 But how does this cash itself out in the 
case of a few examples? Consider three.  
 
1. A woman feels uncertain as to whether she should go through with her wedding. 
The church and reception hall have been booked, and the invitations sent out. Yet she 
is having serious doubts about whether she and her fiancé are really right for each 
other. Does she love him? Yes, but perhaps not enough. Would she miss him if they 
split up? Yes, she thinks, but perhaps she‟s really more worried about the effects 
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rejection might have on him. She‟s started to suspect that he loves her more than she 
loves him, and she thinks that this is not a healthy basis for a marriage. Perhaps her 
reluctance to do the brave thing and call it off is motivated more by cowardice than 
genuine love. In Frankfurt‟s terms, she doesn‟t know what she wants. Should she stay 
or should she go? 
 
2. A young philosophy professor‟s career has started encouragingly well. He‟s on 
track for tenure, is getting good teaching evaluations, and his first book has just come 
out to enthusiastic reviews. He genuinely enjoys most aspects of his job - and yet 
something is missing. He‟s always hankered for more literary freedom than academic 
writing affords him, and since his teens has always really wanted to be a novelist. He 
uses whatever extremely limited spare time he can find, when his wife is in bed and 
the baby is finally asleep, to work away at that manuscript in the bottom drawer. He 
could get the manuscript finished if it weren‟t for his full-time job at the university. 
He could, of course, jump off the career ladder and devote himself full-time to the 
novel – but then how would he pay the bills?  That would surely be grossly 
irresponsible given his family duties. Perhaps, then, he should give up on his dream 
altogether. But what kind of person would that make him? He‟d be living with his 
regret, and perhaps thereby coming to resent those around him. Perhaps then he 
should continue with the current arrangement. But suppose trying to be both a 
philosopher and a novelist leads him to fail at both? Moreover, it might not be until 
the very end of his life that this fact becomes clear: that what was possible for Sartre 
and Iris Murdoch has not been possible for him. What should he do?  
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3. A young lawyer‟s career is also going well, and he too is engaged. Yet although his 
fiancée tolerates the amount of time he spends at the office, she doesn‟t really 
understand how important his career is to him. Her commitment to conventional 
family life is far greater than his, and he knows that once they are married, she will 
want kids within a year or two. He‟s worried that this scenario will prevent his 
climbing the corporate ladder. Maybe he won‟t make partner within five years, which 
was always his goal. Should he call off the wedding, dump his fiancée and focus 
exclusively on his career? 
 
What would Frankfurt say about these cases? They range from genuine and I take it 
understandable cases of ambivalence (the first two) to a case (the third) in which one 
concern - career - borders on the monomaniacal. Yet against the background of such 
real-life cases, Frankfurt‟s advice to “know what we want” rings false to the 
complexity of the lived moral life.
118
 How can we necessarily judge in advance what 
we should want? As Stanley Cavell points out, in both art and life, “you do not know 
in advance what may arise as a significant detail”.119 Also, is it clear that the 
philosopher who also wants to be a novelist is guilty of an “incoherent greed”? It 
seems unfair to compare him unfavourably with the career-obsessed lawyer, whom I 
take it most of us would advise to think about things other than just his career. Yet the 
philosopher is the more ambivalent of the two. 
 
Quinn suggests that the “Apollonian” stress on the internal harmony of the self 
emphasized by Frankfurt and Davenport needs to be complemented by a more 
“Dionysian” element that recognizes that “human values are irreducibly plural, 
inexhaustible, sometimes incommensurable, and often conflicting”.120 The ability to Comment [JL1]: eti 
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appreciate a wide diversity of values is itself a significant component in the overall 
meaningfulness of a human life. Now, Davenport makes clear that by unity he does 
not have in mind a single-minded devotion to one theme in relation to which the rest 
of life is subservient (such as in the case of the career-obsessed lawyer). Rather, he 
says, it can be “the unity of a narrative with a wide range of diverse themes and 
subplots involving values that are incomparable or not ranked on any single objective 
scale”.121 But this will not help unless it is made clear wherein the unity of a narrative 
is supposed to consist, and this is precisely the clarification that MacIntyrean 
Kierkegaardians owe us.  
 
I suggest that the focus on unity and wholeheartedness, despite its prima facie appeal, 
is potentially dangerous insofar as it can sponsor a kind of existential myopia. 
Another way of putting this point is that there is a potential tension between 
wholeness and well-roundedness.
122
 If we maintain wholeness by limiting the 
diversity of our commitments, we might miss, in Jeffrey Blustein‟s words,  
the invigorating effect of variety, as well as the chance to enrich our lives by 
being open to feelings, attachments, and values that incline us in different 
directions … by giving greatest weight to wholeness in the conduct of our 
lives we neglect an important dimension along which lives may be 
evaluated… A well-rounded life of coherent commitment may be a better 
life for a person to live than a life that sacrifices well-roundedness for 
wholeness despite the greater difficulty of achieving and maintaining 
integrity in these circumstances.
123
 
 
 36 
I think Blustein is right. We can see why by considering a distinction sometimes 
made, along similar lines to Frankfurt and Davenport, between unconditional (or 
“identity-conferring”) and defeasible commitments.124 John Kekes, for example, has 
argued that the feature of integrity he labels “wholeness” or “constancy”125 involves 
adhering to “the pattern of hierarchically organised commitments that compose one‟s 
life”.126 Blustein glosses this as follows: “A commitment‟s ranking in this hierarchy is 
a function of the status the agent accords it so far as core identity or life-plan is 
concerned.”127 Crucial to this way of thinking is the distinction between commitments 
that are “unconditional” and those that are merely defeasible. On this view, if a 
defeasible and an unconditional commitment come into conflict, the latter should take 
precedence if integrity is not to be lost. As Kekes puts it, “we must learn to 
distinguish between the centre of our character, where our deepest commitments lie, 
and the outer layers, which we can afford to compromise, if need be”.128 A central 
task of the virtue Kekes labels “self-direction” is “to draw and maintain this 
distinction”.129 “To have a coherent character”, he claims, “is to have made 
unconditional commitments”.130 Self-direction “is conditional on living according to 
one‟s unconditional commitments and according to as many of one‟s defeasible and 
loose commitments as circumstances allow.”131 
 
This line of reasoning is indeed likely to have a prima facie appeal to anyone who 
cares about integrity. But – and this is my point - there is a problem. What such an 
approach seems to presuppose is that the ethically exemplary person operates with 
two reasonably explicit lists of commitments - one unconditional and one defeasible - 
and that it is not possible for these commitments to switch lists. Such a picture takes 
insufficiently seriously the possibility of a kind of moral “aspect-dawning”, akin to 
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what Jamie Ferreira calls a “transforming vision”, in which, as it were, one‟s ethical 
applecart is upturned.
132
 What prevents the possibility of a shift in one‟s ethical (or 
religious) vision such that what had previously struck one as merely defeasible comes 
to seem unconditional, or vice versa? Religious conversion and loss of faith are only 
the most obvious instances of such a shift. Colin Lyas asks: “couldn‟t one think that 
one had been brought to see oneself or the world rightly, and, indeed, live a whole life 
in the spirit of that revelation and, at the last, come to realize that this was not 
right?”133 Think of Tolstoy‟s Ivan Ilyich.134 Yet this need hardly be a death-bed 
revelation. As Lyas adds, “our moral views, and more generally our views of life, are 
constantly brought to the bar of experience and can alter in consequence. We can 
never be sure when this is going to happen.”135 
 
If this is right, then what becomes of Frankfurt‟s recommendation? Frankfurt claims 
that in trying to decide which of the many things to which we are attracted are 
actually going to matter to us, “we must anticipate the extent to which each can be 
coherently elaborated in our lives”.136 But how useful is this as a piece of practical 
advice? To what extent is such anticipation possible? Frankfurt‟s advice will not 
enable our hesitant bride to decide whether to go through with the wedding. Her 
problem is precisely that she cannot “anticipate” what to do for the best. (Or, to put it 
in the language Kierkegaard uses in Purity of Heart, the problem is precisely with 
anticipating what would constitute “willing the good in truth” in this situation.) A 
similar point applies in the philosopher-novelist and career-obsessed lawyer cases – 
though here there is the additional danger that trying to anticipate whether a course of 
action can be “coherently elaborated in our lives” might lead to unnecessarily limiting 
decisions. (For example, the fact that our lawyer is unable to see how family life is 
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compatible with a successful career might simply amount to a lack of imagination on 
his part.)  
 
With such concerns in mind, it is useful to contrast the Frankfurtian approach 
recommended by Davenport with that of Martha Nussbaum. In her discussion of 
Henry James‟s The Golden Bowl, Nussbaum focuses upon the process of moral 
maturity as it develops in the character of Maggie Verver. A crucial part of Maggie‟s 
development, for Nussbaum, is her replacement of “little girls‟ questions” with a more 
“adult” mode of moral deliberation as she comes to question the nature of her 
attachments to her husband and her father. Crucial to this is precisely an increased 
scepticism about what we can “anticipate”:  
 
When are we to pursue this ideal and when to let it go? How much is deep 
love worth, and under what circumstances is it worth a blinding? What 
boundaries are we to draw? What priorities can we fix? These, I take it, are 
the little girls‟ questions … She wants to be told ahead of time exactly 
what‟s right and when. She wants to know exactly how much she loves this 
person, and exactly what choices this entails. To counter her insistent 
demand, James repeatedly, in the second half of the novel, holds up to us a 
different picture: that of an actress who finds, suddenly, that her script is not 
written in advance and that she must “quite heroically” improvise her role 
… The final understanding to which his criticism of little girls transports us 
is that this is what adult deliberation is and should be. And there‟s no safety 
in that, no safety at all.
137
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Note the claim: mature ethical deliberation involves openness to risk and readiness to 
venture into uncharted waters. To refuse this is to “miss the adventure” that life 
throws at us. In an illuminating discussion of Nussbaum, Cora Diamond quotes the 
mountaineer George Mallory: “To refuse the adventure is to run the risk of drying up 
like a pea in its shell. Mountaineers, then, take opportunities to climb mountains 
because they offer adventure necessary to them.”138 Both Mallory‟s sense of 
adventure and that which James and Nussbaum see as central to the moral life 
“involve the response of the quickened sense of life to what is appreciated as having 
its mysteries and depths and uncertainties and dangers; both involve an openness to 
surprise”.139  
 
On Nussbaum‟s picture, “a fixed antecedent ordering or ranking among values is to be 
taken as a sign of immaturity rather than excellence”.140 Instead of valorising unity, 
wholeheartedness and anticipation, Nussbaum claims that “it is the job of the adult 
agent to approach a complex situation responsively, with keen vision and alert 
feelings, prepared, if need be, to alter his or her prima facie conception of the good in 
the light of the new experience”.141 In The Golden Bowl, she claims, we are shown 
that an excessive focus on harmony “followed out to its strictest conclusion, generates 
an extraordinary blindness to value and ends by subordinating the particular claim of 
each commitment and love to the claims of harmony”.142 
 
In a recent discussion of Frankfurt and his critics, Marya Schechtman puts a version 
of this point as follows. Drawing on the comparison often made, ever since Plato, 
between selves and states, Schechtman suggests that Frankfurt‟s critics have accused 
his picture of “over-estimating the danger of internal civil war”.143 Even if Frankfurt‟s 
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insight that freedom has little value if we do not know what we want has merit, it is 
just as important to realise that self-constraint can become unhealthily repressive. In 
line with what Quinn and I are suggesting, Schechtman suggests that “the work of 
shaping a life is less of a task of micro-management”144 than the Frankfurt picture 
sponsored by Davenport encourages us to think. “It is less about directly settling 
conflicts than about establishing safe boundaries within which these conflicts can be 
allowed to play themselves out.”145 
 
Overall, then, I am making two claims in this section. First, that Frankfurt and 
Davenport tend to exaggerate the degree to which we can anticipate outcomes and 
plan our lives accordingly. Second, that such a focus on “unity” overlooks an 
important aspect of moral vision. If we are not careful, our determination to follow 
our “life-plans”, to pursue our “goals”, threatens to lead to a kind of moral blindness, 
a lack of moral imagination. This is at least as serious a danger as the lack of direction 
of which Judge William accuses A. As Diamond puts it, “Seeing the possibilities in 
things is a matter of a kind of transforming perception of them”.146 The problem is 
this: what reason do we have to be confident that those “wholeheartedly willing to be 
wholehearted” are those best placed for this kind of transforming perception or 
vision? Might not more openness, and less wholeheartedness, often serve us better?  
 
I do not want to deny that self-choice, wholeheartedness and self-direction are 
important components of an ethical life. But I do want to support Quinn‟s claim that 
there are serious dangers with putting too much emphasis on such aspects. For 
perhaps the clearest way in which to see how too “pre-planned” a picture risks over-
simplifying what a human life is like, consider love: more precisely, that dimension of 
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love which requires a willingness to be transformed by the other, such that it becomes 
difficult to say where your plans and “goals” end and his or hers begin.147 In some 
sense, this involves a willingness to have the “narrative unity” of one‟s life disrupted 
or even shattered.
148
 Would supporters of “unity” and “wholeheartedness” deny this? 
Perhaps their response would be that one should just build this into the next stage of 
one‟s life narrative. But again, the threat of emptiness looms large here: if any radical 
eruption of my life can be fitted into its narrative, it again becomes unclear exactly 
what the supporters of “narrative unity” are telling us. Once again, we are forced to 
ask by what criteria we could judge one narrative as “unified” and another as not.  
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have argued (in section I) that despite what commentators such as 
Anthony Rudd have maintained, the MacIntyrean idea of “narrative unity” cannot be 
used to show the superiority of the ethical over the aesthetic life in Kierkegaard‟s 
Either-Or. Judge William‟s argument for the ethical in fact contains far more in the 
way of substantive normative content than can be encapsulated in the idea of 
“narrative unity”. Moreover, the MacIntyre-inspired claim that narratives confer 
intelligibility will not enable us to distinguish a Kierkegaardian aesthete from a 
Kierkegaardian ethicist. In section II, I drew attention to serious problems with 
MacIntyre‟s own use of the notion of narrative. First, by taking literary narratives as 
the default kind of narrative, MacIntyre offers a misleading guide to understanding 
human life. Second, our status as temporal beings resists the idea that any human life 
could be “unified” or “whole”, leaving it very unclear what MacIntyre means when he 
talks about the importance of having a sense of one‟s “whole life”. Third, the 
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perspectival nature of narrative reveals self-deception to be a serious problem. Finally, 
in section III, I turned to the wider question of whether unity and wholeheartedness 
are really as desirable in a human life as many suppose. I concluded that supporters of 
unity and wholeheartedness tend to exaggerate the degree to which we can anticipate 
and plan our futures, and that a certain kind of moral blindness attends an excessive 
concern with unity and wholeheartedness. Thus the desire for “unity” in a human life 
may be a far less urgent need than some have supposed.
149
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faith, Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling, tells 
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advance the line described here. I shall call commentators who view Kierkegaard‟s 
and MacIntyre‟s projects as potential allies “MacIntyrean Kierkegaardians”. 
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 One commonly cited specification is that of Jerome Bruner: “a narrative is 
composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings involving human 
beings as characters or actors. These are its constituents … Their meaning is given by 
their place in the overall configuration of the sequence as a whole – its plot or fabula” 
(Bruner, 1990, p. 43). Marya Schechtman quotes this approvingly, but also adds that 
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crucial respects to the narrative others tell of his life” (Schechtman, 1996, p. 96). 
However, it should be noted just how broad the term “narrative” is, and just how 
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minimal the conditions are for something to count as a narrative. For instance, Peter 
Lamarque has recently suggested the following conditions: “at least two events must 
be depicted in a narrative and there must be some more or less loose, albeit non-
logical, relation between the events” (Lamarque, 2004, p. 394). There is a temporal 
dimension to narrative, but this can include simultaneity. Thus “I turned the key and 
the door opened” is, on this minimal definition, a narrative. On such a definition, 
Lamarque is surely right that “very little of substance can be inferred from the 
premise that a piece of discourse is a narrative” (ibid.)  
12
 As well as Rudd, several other contributors to Kierkegaard After MacIntyre – 
including Jeffrey Turner, Norman Lillegard, Edward Mooney and John Davenport – 
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by the term “narrative”.  
13
 Strawson, 2004, p. 439. 
14
 Rudd, 2001, pp. 138-139. Note what is and is not being claimed here. Rudd‟s claim 
presupposes that the aesthete already has an identity in a certain minimal sense. To 
lack a “sense” of personal identity is not the same thing as lacking a personal identity. 
As Keith Yandell puts it, “only something that is already a person can get a sense of 
identity by identifying with a story. What identifying with the story typically does is 
to further refine a sense of identity already possessed, but a sense of identity is one 
thing and identity as a person is another, and however intimately they may be related, 
they are not identical.” (Yandell, 2001 p. 258). For this reason, we can easily be 
misled by Kierkegaard‟s talk of “becoming a self”. In order for what he has in mind to 
make sense, anyone capable of responding to such a call must already a self in some 
more minimal sense. 
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15
 Rudd has confirmed in personal discussion that this is his understanding; Davenport 
expresses the same view in Davenport, 2001a, pp. 95-96. Compare Kierkegaard‟s 
remark that “most people in Christendom … live in esthetic or, at most esthetic-
ethical categories” (Kierkegaard, 1859/1998, p. 43).  
16
 Davenport, 2001a, p. 95.  
17
 MacIntyre, 1985, p. 209. 
18
 Ibid., p. 210. 
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 Ibid. 
20
 See Kierkegaard, 1843/1987b, pp. 291-293. 
21
 Two possible objections need to be considered at this point. It has been suggested 
that the unintelligibility of one‟s life to oneself is a more common feature than I allow 
for, the example being given of kleptomaniacs who are unable to explain why they do 
what they do. But Rudd is trying to use intelligibility to distinguish aesthetes from 
ethicists in general, so such an extreme counter-example as this will hardly be enough 
to support this case. Second, it has been suggested that a person may be mistaken 
about whether his life is “really” intelligible. Viewed in a certain way, this is indeed a 
real and present danger, though as I shall later suggest in discussing self-deception, it 
is a danger that haunts far more than aesthetes (and so once again will not enable 
Rudd to make the distinction that he wants). But it is crucial here to ask: “Intelligible 
to whom?” One suggestion that has been made is that one might judge the 
intelligibility of a given life with reference to an “ideal observer”. But such a move 
will not help at all in respect of the issue at stake between MacIntyre and his 
Kierkegaardian commentators. That issue is whether an ethicist can give a reason for 
an aesthete to embrace the ethical life that will be compelling to the aesthete. As Rudd 
comments elsewhere, “Neat-looking neo-Kantian arguments that appear convincing in 
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the abstract, in a philosopher‟s study, may seem a little hollow if we imagine them 
being read with A‟s mocking eyes” (Rudd, 1993, p. 68). Anyone familiar with A‟s 
writings will be able to see that appeals to “ideal observers” will meet the same fate. 
What matters for the argument of Either-Or is not what an “ideal observer” makes of 
A‟s (or another aesthete‟s) life, but how A (or that other aesthete) himself sees it. 
Judge William‟s argument, in other words, needs to appeal to the aesthete himself. 
And this, as Rudd rightly notes, is precisely what the Judge tries to do. I am grateful 
to the Philosophy Colloquium at St Olaf College for discussion of these points.  
22
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 Rudd, 2001, p. 131. 
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 Ibid., p. 140. 
32
 Ibid., p. 138. The Judge does indeed make this charge against A specifically: that 
his life lacks continuity and therefore meaning (Kierkegaard, 1843/1987b, p. 195). 
“You have no life-view”, he adds (ibid., p. 202). But whether this is true of A or not, 
note that it is not intended as a charge against the aesthetic in general. It must be a 
charge against the position of “despair itself”, since other aesthetes have indeed been 
said to have a life-view: hedonism (ibid., p. 179). 
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 Ibid., p. 183. 
35
 Note also that such manifestations of the aesthetic life as this are not, in Peter 
Mehl‟s words, lives “without meaning or purpose; my self is not aimless but built 
around concrete possibilities and talents that I saw (and still see) as live options for 
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There is a scene part way through the novel in which the central character, the middle-
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each other because they‟re eating in silence. But does that mean they‟re unhappy with 
each other‟s company? Not at all. … It‟s not that they have nothing to say to each 
other, but that it doesn‟t have to be said. Being happily married means that you don‟t 
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